The link for the question is to an article on radar.oreilly.com: a political
and for-profit private commercial forum all at once. The well
connected and Kevin Kelly,
"Senior Maverick" of Wired Magazine, makes the case for
technology as life in a video interview there.
Briefly summarizing his points in the interview:
The net had a big impact on the elections. The form and function
of web sites and other technology has great impact on the
behavior of users. Technology can be regarded as a life form with
its own "wants". We (humans) are the sexual organs of
technology. A mode of analysis similar to Dawkins'
"selfish gene" concept is worth applying to technology.
I hope people appreciate just the news above. I humbly submit one
more thing:
I have a reply to both Kelly's reasoning and to its
appearance on "radar.oreilly.com". My reply appears to
have been censored from "radar.oreilly.com" and so, I
offer it below the fold.
Um...
Isn't he really adopting a kind of ethical nihilism here by
attributing to "technology" a teleology that denies the
role of humans as the ultimate "deciders"? To unpack
that a bit:
He talks at length about what technology "wants". For
example, he says, technology wants clean water for the
manufacture of chips. He says technology wants clean air (for
unexplained reasons). And, yes, there's that quip about
humans being "the sexual organs of technology".
Well, this is some very old school sophistry -- that word game
goes way back. A little green alien landing on the planet 250,000
years ago might wonder, upon first glance at things, whether a
web is part of a spider's toolkit for making more spiders or
if it isn't the opposite: perhaps a spider is a web's way
of making more webs.
Both are true in the most vacuous sense but once our little green
alien observes the life cycles more clearly, surely the
conclusion will arise that it's more natural to recognize
that spiders make webs as part of the process of making more
spiders (spider makes web, spider catches food, spider converts
energy from food to make more spiders). The spider's web is a
passive thing and the main thing it "wants" to do is
fall apart: thus we see spiders constantly repairing their webs
and making new ones.
There being a cycle there -- spiders and webs locked in an
inter-dependent relationship -- we could poetically say that
"the universe here 'wants' to make spiders and
webs" but that hardly says anything more than "spiders
and webs exist".
Technology, like spider webs, seems mostly to "want" to
fall apart and stop functioning. A running internal combustion
engine, for example, "wants" to keep running for a
while while there is fuel coming in but it "wants" to
use that fuel up, with wear and tear, then stop, then rust in
place. The engine has no tendency -- no "want" -- to
drive to a refueling station or, for that matter, to go exploring
for oil. The engine, as any mechanic can tell you, wants to be
rock.
Rocks don't have sex organs.
He makes a kind of comparison of his way of talking about the
"wants" of technology to Dawkins' "selfish
gene" concept and yet, if we take the most defensible
version of the selfish gene concept, it's nothing like
technology. A gene is a partial-control element within a
metabolism such that -- and this gets to the key ethical point --
such that the metabolism is constrained by physical law to
honor the gene's control. Taking a simple single-celled
asexual life form, for example: in certain environments the cell
will reproduce. There is no choice. The fundamental laws
of physics assure it. It "wants" to reproduce in
exactly the same sense that the universe "wants" the
cell to be there in the first place: the existence of the cell is
real (the universe "wants" precisely "what
exists") and an aspect of what exists is an unavoidable,
fated reproduction of the cell (in a suitable environment).
Technology is quite different. Its reproduction is a question of
choice. We can only start calling the reproduction of
technology a natural "want" of technology if we assume
that humans have no choice over the matter. And that's why
his position is one of ethical nihilism: Why, there's nothing
we can do!
One can see how such nihilism would be attractive in the context
of trade press like radar: the last thing you want to hear when
you are trying to make money on the margins of cheerleading an
industry is "all of our techno-niche here is a big mistake
and we should kill it." But you are in no danger at all of
having to contemplate such a question if you just assert from the
beginning, perhaps helped with a little grey-beard sophistry,
that, well, the technology is just going to do what it will do
because it "wants" to so let's make the best of it.
Ethical nihilism.
I found more interesting his earlier comments (prompted by your
interview questions) about "setting defaults". He looks
at examples like "opt-out vs. opt-in" or the rules that
give structure to the editing process of Wikipedia and exclaims
some fascination about how those defaults and that structure
"nudge behavior" of crowds.
That's not sophistry it's only trite but it does refer to
empirical facts. It refers to "what the universe
wants". People know this well from time-motion studies, from
marketing studies, from studies of the human factors of user
interfaces, and on and on.
Yet it's an uncomfortable area to get into here, at "Web
2.0" central, precisely because to the extent we take it
seriously it isn't ethical nihilism but ethical problematics.
Perhaps it is wrong to not be deeply critical of, say,
Wikipedia precisely because of the power imbalances that
are reinforced by the structure given to it by its elites.
Perhaps spinning flattering yarns about its evolution is
wrong because it encourages powerful people to invest huge
sums in trying to make more of the same, or similar.
But there, we are no longer talking about the "wants"
of technology at all but rather of the wants and relations among
people. When we start doing that we have to start recognizing
that much of technology is in fact employed as
human-on-human weaponry and that the dynamics of its creation,
promotion, spread, and acceptance are all-too-human questions.
But if we go down that path we might start hesitating. We might
trying to resist and substitute. We might try to extinguish a
given technology and replace it on ethical grounds.
So much simpler if we can just suck up to power and explain away
their actions by saying "Why, they're powerless!
It's just what technology 'wants' to do!"
While wishing to still honor our apparent "silent
gentleman's agreement" to leave each other alone for
what remains of the 120 days I hope you will forgive me for
replying directly just to say that, yes, the comment has now
appeared. After a long delay (e.g., a later comment in another
thread appeared first) and after the comment first appeared here
(though that doesn't prove cause and effect).
I broke it first. Only to note that it showed up though.
Back to being silent (and that was really hard on a couple
of posts you made on the weekend & today).
Was just testing. I'm comfortable with where you've been.
I hope likewise. Heads up that the Conway proof I've been
referring too and the C. Hitchens take on the civility of theism
have been on my mind lately, not least in how they relate to the
(no traditional religion involved) problematics of tech industry
hegemony (as exemplified by O'Reilly) so be aware that (the
bit about John Lennon aside) I'm not trying to poke you (and
I thought that poke was gentle enough to see where we are
and I'm not upset about the outcome -- and don't feel
you'll offend if you want to get in some last digs under that
topic, I owe you that. I appreciate the recent change -- thank
you.)
Neither genes nor machines "want" anything: wanting
implies self-motivation. My server downstairs doesn't
"want" to rebuild its RAID around the failed drive, it
does so because it really has no choice in the matter: the code
for mdadm says "if dead_drive and spare_available then
rebuild_array(with spare)". Likewise, the gene in my
personal genome which says my hair shall be 6'2"
(unfortunately, I am 6'3") doesn't "want"
me to be bald on top, it simply is doing what it does.
Yes, in a way a chicken is an egg's way of making more eggs,
but an egg doesn't "want" to make any more eggs.
The rooster, on the other hand....
Yes, you can apply some of the concepts of "natural"
selection, "mutation", and "reproduction" to
technology, and to some extent they make sense. But to take that
to the step of saying that Windows "wants" to continue
to exist is silly.
Now, one fine day we may actually see self-willed machines, but I
would assert that in most cases that is exactly what we DON'T
want: I don't want my car saying "Screw you I'm not
going out! I don't care if you are out of milk, you should
have picked that up on the way home last night. It's snowing,
they are salting the roads, and I am NOT going to risk rusting
out for your pathetic meatbag self!" Knight Rider be damned
- it would be more of a pain in the ass arguing with KITT than
just pointing the wheel down the road and hitting the gas.
Indeed, many of the good Dr. Asimov's robot stories were
about the lengths to which US Robotics went to PREVENT robots
from exercising "free will" and "self
motivation" by the constraints of the Three Laws of
Robotics. Unfortunately, Asimov knew that any attempt to have
simple, rigid laws for behavior would lead to catastrophe -
Godel's completeness theorem tells you any set of laws that
are complete are going to be inconsistent, and any consistent
laws are going to be incomplete.
So, for the foreseeable future, let's not ascribe intention
to things without it: LOLCats may "WANT", I may
"want", Dr. House may "want", but neither my
genome (nor any part thereof) nor my computer "want"
anything.
I used to work on a thing called SCATS (Sydney Coordinated
Adaptive Traffic System). At one level it just processes data:
traffic counts, button presses, configuration changes, etc. But
it clearly has wants. They are defined in statistical terms. The
system spends its time satisfying its wants. Raising alarms when
parts of it need attention. Being tended to by adult humans.
I reckon SCATS was about as intelligent as my newborn son was in
March 2002. He had wants too, but they were really programmed by
his genes. In SCATS the wants are (or at least were then) hand
assembled in PDP 11 machine code. Yes, its an old system. Like
DNA it is pretty arcane and difficult to maintain if you
don't know what you are doing.
I think there are points where human and machine intelligence
connect. I know what my internal experience feels like but I
don't know anything about yours. I assume that you are an
intelligent human, different from software but that is really
just a convention since we are now at the point where you really
could be software and I wouldn't know the difference. There
was a turing test competition recently where machines started
coming out ahead.
I think the question soon will be "what do they want?".
Seriously, what do dolphins want? We don't really know
because we can't access their internal worlds, so we have to
make assumptions based on their behaviour. Compared to machines,
dolphins are almost like us.
See, it's hard to talk about because engineer to engineer I
would use "want" in the same technical sense you are
when you attribute "wants" to SCATS. A less esoteric
example of that usage would be to talk about a non-true bicycle
wheel, one warped in a particular way, and an engineer saying
"If we mount it with this side on the left then the
wheel 'wants' to turn left." That would mean that
the alignment of physical forces is such that it keeps pulling to
the left.
But "wants" isn't the right word to describe how
"SCATS" controlled actual traffic.
"Wants" is the right word to describe how
"SCATS" controlled various digital signals under
certain operating conditions. It's very different.
"Life" (in the sense of "the universe") tests
the control elements of, say, one of Dawkins' genes by
physics -- by the necessary impact on metabolism. SCATS, a
software system, has but a necessary impact on digital signals --
not human traffic patterns. It "wants" digital signals
(input and output) to satisfy certain constraints. It is
"disinterested" beyond that. For example, SCATS
software is quite happy to be never run at all. It is also quite
happy to be run with false signals. It is also quite happy to
produce output with no human meaning or an adverse human meaning.
There is nothing *necessary* about SCATS role in our human lives
other than our than that which arises from our (seeming) *choice*
about whether and how to use SCATS.
You're mis-applying the judgement of "which
'wants' what" in a way that subtracts out the role
of human choice -- and thus you wind up in the ethically
nihilistic position that Kelly does. Stop theorizing so much
about "want" and take its ordinary, informal meaning,
if you want to keep ethical clarity.
Tom I know you have seen Blade Runner. You quoted it in a
different post. So I am curious to see what your answer is to
Philip K Dick's question.
I certainly think they could "dream of electric sheep".
If not now, then sooner than we expect.
For me, moral questions should not put our species at the centre.
I don't think this means abandoning morals, but it may mean
starting with fewer knowns.
Tom I know you have seen Blade Runner. You quoted it in a
different post. So I am curious to see what your answer is to
Philip K Dick's question.
It's a great movie containing a great allegory about class.
Classic noire trick of making the protagonist an anti-hero
"investigator" and so we're assured there will be
danger and conflict and lack of moral clarity yet we get to
follow this guy as he travels across class barriers uncovering
information about the overall structure of a heavily segmented
society -- it's a screen-writing trick to generate an excuse
to "tour" an imagined world. What a great metaphor that
the replicants, in many ways morally, intellectually, and
physically superior to normal humans are essentially slaves whose
lives are owned by a corporation that strives (in vain) to
deprive them of developing a full humanity in order to maximize
the amount of labor that can be extracted from them. And we see
the complicity and the slavery-of-a-different-kind of all of the
normal humans who contribute to the production of these slaves.
Of particular interest to technocrats should be the pathos of
weakness of Sebastian, the cowardly anti-hero to Deckard's
hero. Finally, for the necessary "twist of the knife"
characteristic of noire, we see the conspiracy of the hyper-rich
Dr. Tyrell and the hyper-armed Gaff which serves to (ambiguously
but not encouragingly) locate our protagonist's position in
the vast web of corruption and decadence his investigation
uncovers: he is Gaff's blade, and Gaff's toy.
In the world of Blade Runner, everyone is doomed to unrealized
potential and misery and oppression except Gaff and
Tyrell, and even Tyrell turns out to be Gaff's pawn, in
the end.
To answer your question: Dick's question ("Do androids
dream...") is a question about the humanity of an oppressed
slave class. It is an excerpt from a scholastic debate on the
question: are slaves human? You can imagine a party for elites in
Tyrell's pyramid where, over c*cktails, a friendly exchange
goes "Well, isn't that the question, really? Are the
slaves human?" "Surely they are," might offer the
liberal poser, "for example, do they not dream like
humans?" "Perhaps they dream but if they do, would they
not dream only the dreams of slaves?"
So, Dick's question isn't really about the potential of
machines. After all, the replicants in Blade Runner aren't
exactly machines, at all, they are altered humans -- they're
biologically engineered, not assembled from inert ingredients. In
a sense they're bred, not made.
Do I think that machines can develop human consciousness? No. I
see the evidence as indicating that human consciousness is
thoroughly "embodied" -- it's a unique property of
a human body. All the "subtle stuff" of metabolism and
of physical presence in the world looks to me like it is
inseparable from conscious experience and it is beyond simulation
for reasons of complexity if no others.
Do I think that machines can have something that might reasonably
be called "non-human consciousness"? Yes. I see the
evidence as indicating that consciousness of some form is best
understood as a property of the universe itself -- even
elementary particles have a parcel of it. But it's also a
mistake to over-interpolate that and wrongly anthropomorphize.
For example, looking at the telephone on my desk, I don't
think that for the phone there is some kind of self-aware "I
am a phone" consciousness there. Conscious experience, it
seems most likely to me, is the universe's experience of wave
function collapse -- it is a set of quantum computations. There
is no other physical phenomenon I'm aware of that has a
chance to explain it's simultaneously monadic and
spacially/temporally-extensive nature. "Qualia" are
indivisible and yet "contain" information that
isn't localized in space and time -- that describes an
entanglement collapsing.
If that hypothesis is right it suggests that computers, as an
essential part of their operation, are host to many, tiny,
"non-humanly conscious" experiences but this hardly
suggests that there is a "computer consciousness" or
that we could build a machine with anything even vaguely
resembling a human consciousness.
Alas, calling this view a "hypothesis" is a stretch:
it's not empirically testable. It's not a scientific
hypothesis -- more like an exegesis on the conceptual
implications of some well established science.
-t
p.s.: Apparently you can not spell out the word
"c*cktails" on Technocrat.
Evolution in biology occured without self-motivation, unless
you're willing to attribute self-motivation to bacteria and
single-celled organisms.
I believe his use of the term "want" may be closer to
"evolutionary pressure", or "tendency".
Self-motivation and conscious free will may come later, whether
we desire it or not.
And I would hesitate to anthromoporphize the desires of a
technological intelligence as you did with the car analogy.
The outlook on "life" would be vastly different if you
could clone your mind in the blink of an eye, or if you could
have perfect-state backups.
As far as technology being the 7th kingdom of life, you'd
have to give a fairly broad definition of "life".
I don't believe any technology yet fits the definition of
"alive", though have no problem allocating it a kingdom
if/when that comes to pass.
A sphere at the top of a smooth hill "wants" (in the
sense Kelly is using) to roll downhill.
That's a reasonable, if a bit technical use of the term
"wants."
But he gets from there to "Technology wants clean
water" and I'm trying to help pinpoint the multitude of
errors he makes along the way -- and more importantly the social
consequences (evil ethical nihilism) that follow from that line
of thinking.
It seems several people here have different definitions of
"want", and so we cannot have a meaningful discussion
because we aren't using the same terms.
So let me present a definition of "want" that shows, in
my mind, the difference between, say, Firefox as it processes
this post vs. me as I process this post.
Firefox follows the rules programmed into it. I hit the
"'" key, I get a "'" character. Now
let's suppose that for some silly reason the font this text
box used didn't define a "'" character. Firefox
isn't going to stop, look around, and on it's own
initiative change the font we are using. It's not going to
pull down a font from the 'Net that has "'"
characters. It's not going to stress over the fact that it
cannot display a "'" character. It will happily
show the standard "no character defined" box and move
on, because it doesn't "WANT" to show anything.
I, on the other hand, have wants. If I "want" to get a
"'", I'll find a way. I'll change character
sets, or find a character that looks like "'", or
otherwise seek out some way to meet that want above and beyond
what I have been "programmed" to do.
Consider a dog in a fenced-in back yard. That dog
"wants" out - it will spend every free second it has to
find a way out, digging, jumping, climbing, clawing. If
you've never tried to keep a dog in a fence, you don't
understand how creative they can be in satisfying that
"want".
That's the difference between "want" and
"operationg per natural rules. A ball on the top of a
fencepost doesn't "want" to fall down - it's
not going to try to find a creative way to get down. It will
fall, or not, based upon whether it is in a state of
(meta-)stable equilibrium or unstable equilibrium.
And that is why I'm not sure I "want" my furnace to
"want" to keep the house warm. I don't want my
furnace getting "creative" about how to heat the house.
If I run out of propane, I want it to stop working, not to decide
"Hey, I can keep the house warm if I seize up my blower
motor and run it hot."
Self-willed machines, in most cases, are a bad idea.
In a way, the argument that 'technology wants...' is a
mistake in confusing swarm behavior (which may show
intelligence) with cognitive behavior (which possesses genuine
intelligence). As you observe, any process has
prerequisites. One could just as easily say that plagues
'want' humans (or other living vectors) to
exist so that they (the germs) might exist.
Ultimately, any set of processes could only be considered life if
it is the most complex set of causitive processes in its
environment; other process sets would be (in part at least)
effects, not causes.
Tech as the 7th biological kingdom?
Let's see... when it comes to life there's plants, and animals, and fungus, and a few others.. The question has arisen: is "technology" the 7th biological kingdom?
The link for the question is to an article on radar.oreilly.com: a political and for-profit private commercial forum all at once. The well connected and Kevin Kelly, "Senior Maverick" of Wired Magazine, makes the case for technology as life in a video interview there.
Briefly summarizing his points in the interview:
The net had a big impact on the elections. The form and function of web sites and other technology has great impact on the behavior of users. Technology can be regarded as a life form with its own "wants". We (humans) are the sexual organs of technology. A mode of analysis similar to Dawkins' "selfish gene" concept is worth applying to technology.
I hope people appreciate just the news above. I humbly submit one more thing:
I have a reply to both Kelly's reasoning and to its appearance on "radar.oreilly.com". My reply appears to have been censored from "radar.oreilly.com" and so, I offer it below the fold.
Um...
Isn't he really adopting a kind of ethical nihilism here by attributing to "technology" a teleology that denies the role of humans as the ultimate "deciders"? To unpack that a bit:
He talks at length about what technology "wants". For example, he says, technology wants clean water for the manufacture of chips. He says technology wants clean air (for unexplained reasons). And, yes, there's that quip about humans being "the sexual organs of technology".
Well, this is some very old school sophistry -- that word game goes way back. A little green alien landing on the planet 250,000 years ago might wonder, upon first glance at things, whether a web is part of a spider's toolkit for making more spiders or if it isn't the opposite: perhaps a spider is a web's way of making more webs.
Both are true in the most vacuous sense but once our little green alien observes the life cycles more clearly, surely the conclusion will arise that it's more natural to recognize that spiders make webs as part of the process of making more spiders (spider makes web, spider catches food, spider converts energy from food to make more spiders). The spider's web is a passive thing and the main thing it "wants" to do is fall apart: thus we see spiders constantly repairing their webs and making new ones.
There being a cycle there -- spiders and webs locked in an inter-dependent relationship -- we could poetically say that "the universe here 'wants' to make spiders and webs" but that hardly says anything more than "spiders and webs exist".
Technology, like spider webs, seems mostly to "want" to fall apart and stop functioning. A running internal combustion engine, for example, "wants" to keep running for a while while there is fuel coming in but it "wants" to use that fuel up, with wear and tear, then stop, then rust in place. The engine has no tendency -- no "want" -- to drive to a refueling station or, for that matter, to go exploring for oil. The engine, as any mechanic can tell you, wants to be rock.
Rocks don't have sex organs.
He makes a kind of comparison of his way of talking about the "wants" of technology to Dawkins' "selfish gene" concept and yet, if we take the most defensible version of the selfish gene concept, it's nothing like technology. A gene is a partial-control element within a metabolism such that -- and this gets to the key ethical point -- such that the metabolism is constrained by physical law to honor the gene's control. Taking a simple single-celled asexual life form, for example: in certain environments the cell will reproduce. There is no choice. The fundamental laws of physics assure it. It "wants" to reproduce in exactly the same sense that the universe "wants" the cell to be there in the first place: the existence of the cell is real (the universe "wants" precisely "what exists") and an aspect of what exists is an unavoidable, fated reproduction of the cell (in a suitable environment).
Technology is quite different. Its reproduction is a question of choice. We can only start calling the reproduction of technology a natural "want" of technology if we assume that humans have no choice over the matter. And that's why his position is one of ethical nihilism: Why, there's nothing we can do!
One can see how such nihilism would be attractive in the context of trade press like radar: the last thing you want to hear when you are trying to make money on the margins of cheerleading an industry is "all of our techno-niche here is a big mistake and we should kill it." But you are in no danger at all of having to contemplate such a question if you just assert from the beginning, perhaps helped with a little grey-beard sophistry, that, well, the technology is just going to do what it will do because it "wants" to so let's make the best of it. Ethical nihilism.
I found more interesting his earlier comments (prompted by your interview questions) about "setting defaults". He looks at examples like "opt-out vs. opt-in" or the rules that give structure to the editing process of Wikipedia and exclaims some fascination about how those defaults and that structure "nudge behavior" of crowds.
That's not sophistry it's only trite but it does refer to empirical facts. It refers to "what the universe wants". People know this well from time-motion studies, from marketing studies, from studies of the human factors of user interfaces, and on and on.
Yet it's an uncomfortable area to get into here, at "Web 2.0" central, precisely because to the extent we take it seriously it isn't ethical nihilism but ethical problematics. Perhaps it is wrong to not be deeply critical of, say, Wikipedia precisely because of the power imbalances that are reinforced by the structure given to it by its elites. Perhaps spinning flattering yarns about its evolution is wrong because it encourages powerful people to invest huge sums in trying to make more of the same, or similar.
But there, we are no longer talking about the "wants" of technology at all but rather of the wants and relations among people. When we start doing that we have to start recognizing that much of technology is in fact employed as human-on-human weaponry and that the dynamics of its creation, promotion, spread, and acceptance are all-too-human questions.
But if we go down that path we might start hesitating. We might trying to resist and substitute. We might try to extinguish a given technology and replace it on ethical grounds.
So much simpler if we can just suck up to power and explain away their actions by saying "Why, they're powerless! It's just what technology 'wants' to do!"
-t