E-bay as a barometer of the economy.

Wed Aug 20 08:29:00 -0700 2008
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"Hot off the presses" referred to a phenomenon much like the paper output from a laser printer being warm, bundles of freshly printed newpapers remained warm for an hour or two, and with many major papers having two or three editions per day "hot off the press" meant up to date news.

To a large extent the phenomenon of the web server creating a "hot off the press" edition every time you click a link has killed this old multi-edition dead tree newspaper business model.

This phenomenon has not been confined to the newspaper industry alone, retail sales have suffered from the same phenomenon, and one of the more notable "culprits" in this case is E-bay.

E-bay started out in 1995 as an on-line auction site for individuals, and it was a good idea, but as it grew and attracted more wealth, so it also attracted more "city" type management, and the basic premise of a simple online auction site for individuals has become increasingly sidelined in the war of attrition to get as much of your mindshare as well as as much of your money as possible, passim PayPal etc.

Now, with an estimated >175,000 people in the UK alone who make a living via E-bay, they are changing again, because "Buy it now" has increased from 25% of sales by volume a few years ago to 43% today, and of course "buy it now" quite often represents high ticket price items, so the proportion of sales by value is even greater.

So now E-bay is moving to a straight electronic shopping mall model, ideally, from E-bay's perspective, with all those 175,000 UK E-bayers who make a living out of it shifting to the new, non aution, fixed price shop format.

From the E-bay perspective and the city management types this makes good sense, it sounds a bit like a co-operative Amazon public market, with all the benefits but none of the drawbacks like having to deal with actual stock, or shipping, or customers.

B-bay always claimed it wasn't an auction house per se, and Paypal always claimed it wasn't a bank per se, and now it will no doubt claim it isn't a State, per se, and yet it looks like a duck and walks like a duck and sounds like a duck.

For those 175,000 potential UK E-bay stall-holders / shopkeepers, the unique selling point of E-bay is obvious, the up front costs are basically zero, got a computer, net connection and bank account? Then you're in business.

Try to do the same thing in real life and you need a lot of money up front, you need your market stall lease money, you need your public liability insurance, you need an accountant to keep the tax man happy, and the chances are that you need to employ some qualified and certified electrical engineers if you are even hoping to be selling anything that plugs into the mains supply...

The flip side is a market stall is a fixed fee, unrelated to turnover, whereas E-bay will nickel and dime you to death on each and every single individual sale.

Let's face it, E-bay is a business, and the changes it plans for those 175,000 UK "stallholders" are not going to be aimed at cutting their fees and E-bay's income, on the contrary, it will encourage the "stack em high" methods of sales, which in most cases will involve selling "tat" that has been bought in job lots.

However, the original premise was that E-bay was a barometer of the economy in general, so lets get back to that.

In one sense a vibrant E-bay can be seen as a by-product of a vibrant economy, but upon closer inspection this is not the truth, not even close.

Before the internet we saw the rise and temporary dominance of the "Free ads" dead tree papers. At the time you could pay for a classified ad in the local rag, or pay a lot more for a classified ad in a national rag.

This just doesn't work out financially as being a viable business model, even if all you are trying to do is shift your old collection of bike magazines for a decent price, because the catchment area in terms of numbers of eyeballs per penny of classified ad listing fee killed it.

The Free Ads papers were regional, and placing an advert was absolutely free, and people purchased the paper for a nominal fee, in a sense this was a more modern version of that old UK warhorse the Exchange & Mart (which is still going) and out of the Free Ads papers grew the more specialised ones, like Auto Trader, that specialised in cars, but Auto Trader "double dipped"< in that they charged a listing fee as well as a purchase price for the magazine itself.

These things all worked, and they were all successful, but they lacked two crucial things.

The first thing they lacked was the "hot off the press" immediacy, missed listing your car in this week's edition, then wait a week, which meant it likely took at least two weeks to sell your property.

The second thing they lacked was interactivity, that whole crap about bidding against other people, when the ONLY sensible tactic is to decide what an item is worth to you, bid that amount and then walk away until the listing is finished, you either "won" (har har, roll up, roll up, everyone is a winner, babe) the item or you didn't, however, this interactivity and bidding mania worked as a business plan.

Then came the final part of the "Hot off the press" scenario, instant gratification with Buy It Now.

When you look at E-bay with this true perspective, it becomes quite different, a vibrant E-bay is not a sign of a vibrant economy in general, a vibrant E-bay is in fact just a niche made possible by the internet.

Selling (as I did recently) an old 3/4 horsepower electric motor for a Myford lathe is made possible by the cost of publishing and reading the internet, whereas it would be a waste of time and money to do it in dead tree media.

Sure, E-bay makes a useful place for buyers and sellers to come together (Craigs list is the obvious analogy) buy that just boosts the number of eyeballs, it is NOT a fundamental enabling technology.

So in fact the success E-bay is down to exactly the same TECHNOLOGICAL changes that make e-mail better than Air Mail, it is several orders of magnitude cheaper per word sent and several orders of magnitude faster.

If we try to look for examples in the real world in other areas of industry it isn't quite so easy, for example cheap goods in walmart is a result of outsourcing and offshoring, these are changes in business methodology, not changes in technology.

Once we understand that the success of E-bay is pretty much entirely due to technological changes that brought both the cost and time delay of individual communication down to something approaching zero, we can see that the success grew out of that, with effectively zero cost it becomes economically viable for me to sell an old electric motor.

From this perspective it becomes clear that the sucess of E-bay is predicated on weaknesses in the economy, whether that weakness was the cost effectiveness of classified ads in regional dead tree media, or the lack of capital and local markets for setting up in business.

Looking into my crystal ball, the inevitable next step in the evolution of the E-bay busines phenomenon is to address the sole remaining area where a considerable slice of the selling price does not pass through E-bay, namely carriage and shipping.

The next step is E-bay, market cap 32 billion US dollars, to buy FedEx, market cap 26 billion (UPS market cap is 64 billion) and at that point they have the whole shooting match sewn up, but they still won't be a bank, auction house, shipper or State, per se, you understand.

So a growing E-bay is a sign of a crapping out economy, simply because the underlying enabling technology that makes E-bay possible also serves to support the economy in general.

The ONLY advantage of trading on E-bay is no up front "bricks & mortar" type costs, which basically means you're doing something (eg selling electrical goods) that would be illegal if you did it in the same way from a market stall.

unlikely

Wed Aug 20 11:02:49 -0700 2008
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I doubt anyone will buy UPS: isn't a majority share of the company still closely held? Remember that UPS was entirely a closely held corp until just a few years back (during the first dot-com bubble). At that point, capital was very attractively "priced" on the stock market and UPS was looking at the ramp-up of on-line shopping and the need to grow.... UPS' brand was sufficiently strong that they were able to hold an IPO selling off less than 50% of the company.

I doubt anyone will be buying fedex anytime soon, least of all E-Bay -- not if they know what's good for them, anyway. Logistics actually matter (a lot!) in M&A. E-Bay, today, knows how to run servers and knows how to "run" commerce laws. It knows how to "run" forums. What in the world would E-Bay "bring to the table" for fed-ex, a fuel-intensive firm whose logistical problems are all about real-time, demand-driven routing of trucks and planes, package tracking, etc.? E-Bay doesn't know how to run a fleet of trucks and planes. E-Bay doesn't know how to manage delivery staff. There would be absolutely no (and that means negative) synergy in that kind of deal. E-Bay would buy Fed-Ex and promptly screw it up, immediately de-valuing their purchase. Meanwhile, even if they bought it on paper only and left it alone operationally, what would they get? Revenue and profit for fed-ex is historically fantastic but, these days? I'd be worried about volatility (e.g., as fuel prices do their dance). If the volatility of fed-ex (or another shipper) were contravarient to E-Bay's current upsides and downsides, fine, then the acquisition could make a decent hedge but it isn't: fed-ex's possible downsides coincide with E-Bay's -- E-Bay would be doing little more than taking on extra risk.


The on-line economy cornerstones (Paypal, E-Bay, Amazon) have had a very interesting effect. Famously, they "killed mainstreet" with the help of their accomplices, the big-box stores. I think that's true but not the whole story.

The themes are two-fold: First, as you say, vastly lowered transaction costs thanks to the Internet all up and down the chain. Shopping has changed radically, as you know, for *many* goods and services (not all). Comparison shopping is often easy and cheap compared to the pre-Internet days. Product information available often rivals what one could expect of the average sales clerk and often, with just a little bit of search, you can even find on-line product info from actual experts. Further up the chain, order processing is fully automated, fulfillment largely automated -- all drastically lower transaction costs. Second, inventory management has radically changed with much greater emphasis on JIT production and delivery and tiny, highly tactical inventories. This is a *radical* change from the 1970s. It can be seen in the big-box stores (which are essentially warehouses with cash registers), with Amazon, and even in a sense on E-Bay (which effectively manages a "virtual" inventory whose contents are determined solely by the amount of risk that sellers are willing to take on themselves).

Grocery stores have gone the same way: small grocers with carefully stocked shelves and carefully chosen lines can't compete very well against the larger boxes which are, again, much closer to being warehouses with cash registers. It's too the point where in many of the larger grocery chains you can go there early in the morning and see people "stocking" the shelves and carrying off inventory that isn't moving. Who are those people? Do they work for the grocery store? Generally speaking, no: they are wholesalers from 10 different companies, each there using the store shelves as their reserved loading dock. And watch how they do it: to a one they carry around portable computers, record what's on the shelves, look at the print-outs, and reconfigure the shelves accordingly.

That isn't, mostly, real economic growth -- as you say. Rather, it's undercutting the pre-Internet models, (mostly) reducing margins up and down the chain, then taking a cut. It is strictly an efficiency improvement, freeing up capital for some, but not creating any new real productivity. It works by cutting into existing businesses.

Whence mainstreet.

Basically, the Internet made retail far less profitable and these giants of the new economy make their money by taking a cut of the savings. Again, no real productivity growth -- just the freeing up of a lot of capital.


"Freeing up of capital" includes, for example, one's own labor power. The Internet makes retail much less profitable, more efficient -- so for example there are a lot of unemployed teens who, in years past, might have been "stockboys". There's no real economic growth there, just the potential for it because the price of labor goes down.


As things change thanks to fuel prices, this will get interesting. If more and more consumers are buying "just the basics" then suddenly these large warehouse stores -- either a long drive or a fed-ex trip away from the consumer -- are suddenly "out of scale": the corner market can be competitive again because it need only stock a few items and, what with the death of mainstreet, rents are pretty low.

As the dollar tanks, and fuel skyrockets, and geopolitics gets rocky the purchasing power of, say, a Wal*mart is in for a shock -- they are going to have trouble filling those shelves. E-Bay will have trouble finding new sellers and attrition will whittle away at them.

That's all going down in a context of negative feedback because as those sectors dry up with no real productivity growth to take up the labor, consumer spending ("confidence") falls and accelerates the process.


There is an upside to all of this.

For all the lionizing some of us do of the 1970s and earlier retail economy, it was in many ways a dog. It was corrupt from top to bottom. It was slovenly in inventory mgt. It was antagonistic to "informed purchases". Oh, sure, there were many exceptions -- really precious businesses, now lost. On average, it wasn't all that great.

The "cleaning house" impact of the Internet might be a really good thing. Commercial rents in dense areas have crashed pretty good. Shipping logistics have improved radically. Labor prices are falling. There's a fertile field for retail, if only there was stuff to sell. All that's missing is investment in regional real productivity.


My crystal ball would *guess* that E-Bay will try (and fail) to integrate brick and morter into their customer base in a big way.

People selling paper whose value relies on ad revenues and/or on-line sales of inessential goods are currently caught with their pants down and I suspect that that's starting to sink in. (Google will be very fun to watch suffer. People in the future will wonder how it is that they managed to fail so hard given how much capital they have today and the answer will be entirely and exactly the big cloud of self-reinforcing bullshit in which its main founders, execs, and investors operate -- it is well positioned to fail-by-arrogance.)


Isn't it interesting what's mostly untouched by the Internet, at least around here? Real commodities, components not consumer goods. Try to buy some black schedule 40 steel pipe on-line (at a decent price). Or lumber. Stuff like that. You won't find it. You won't even find prices -- just advice to call the sales staff if you are shopping around a large order. The industries that consume that kind of stuff *long ago* self-organized to provide distributed inventory mgt., efficient delivery, etc. The Internet's retail efficiencies have scarcely touched it.

-t

E-bay as a barometer of the economy.
Thu Aug 21 02:21:42 -0700 2008
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> for example cheap goods in walmart is a result of outsourcing and offshoring

Walmart has the most advanced computer system in the retail sector on the planet, and it's very much part of their efficiency advantage.

> So a growing E-bay is a sign of a crapping out economy, simply because the underlying enabling technology that makes E-bay possible also serves to support the economy in general.

What? Seriously, what?

> The ONLY advantage of trading on E-bay is no up front "bricks & mortar" type costs ...

That's a pretty big advantage, and not the "ONLY" (in caps no less) one. How about the increased market size ("eyeballs", which you mentioned yourself, but conveniently left it out of your "ONLY") for both sellers and buyers? You also seem to disparage it as an advantage. Why?

Take a look at E-Bay's revenue growth over the years. It's pretty consistent, and if anything, percentage-wise, it's slowing (albeit slowly). Even if ebay's growth rate was increasing, I'd be inclined to attribute to other factors (increased online presence and comfort) before I'd jump to the "people just can't afford paying brick and mortar taxes anymore" conclusion. I can afford brick and mortar taxes on all the goods I buy, but I'd rather not, crappy economy or otherwise. In my experience too, the ebay "buy it now" prices are no cheaper than other online retailers (Amazon).

E-bay as a barometer of the economy.
Thu Aug 21 12:13:39 -0700 2008
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> What? Seriously, what?

To the extent that a small number of firms are buying up markets and then using monopoly power to impose transaction fees on *everything* -- that's a collapse. For example, in a free market, if you want to make money on paperclips, you'd better buy paperclips low and sell them high. Make a bad guess, you lose -- you should have invested in staples insteasd. But, what if we layer over that a transaction fee on every transaction and every aspect of every transaction, giving that "rent" to a monopoly or oligopoly? A theoretical bad guy X-Bayazon might run the one site where paperclips and staples can be offered for sale and bought. X-Bayazon can exercise its monopoly power to impose a tax on every transaction: if paperclips are selling, X-Bayazon gets a cut (of the sales prices, the shipping, etc.). If staples are selling, X-Bayazon gets a cut.

Ok, good for X-Bayazon but for the rest of us that's an economic collapse:

The cut X-Bayazon is getting does notrepresent an earned share of improved productivity, not much so anyway. Ok, to be fair it certainly is the result of efficiency gains in the process of retailing but look at the cost of it: because participation in the market itself is a right under private monopoly control, enjoyment (by consumers) of the efficiency gains in retail comes at the cost of granting taxation power to a private entity.

I think that's where Guy is getting the comparison of E-Bay to a State: it's getting some of the powers of a state this way.

If you take the big-box stores and the giant Internet retailers as a group, and sure, maybe give them ownership of the market for ads and for shipping, now you have a complete abandonment, by consumers, of the former, more diversely owned market place. There's a collapse, there. Where formally there was competition for funds transfer, now the market maker (e.g., E-Bay) has the de facto regulatory power to eliminate that competition. Ditto for shipping. Ditto for listing things for sale. It's not a State -- but it has interestingly comparable power over all of trade.


This is what people are talking about when they apply the concept of "creative destruction" to the recent succession of "dot com booms" and related growth spurts. The pattern repeats again and again, across many sectors:

The pattern is that the aggregate revenue in some sector shrinks as a percentage of GDP (or at least its rate of growth falls) -- meanwhile, some software/Internet-intensive company makes profit on the margins of that collapse. So, Craigslist helps destroy classified ads and makes money. E-Bay helps destroy classified adds, swap-meets, small-booth marketplaces, etc. but makes money (gets a cut of the consumer savings) on the margins. RHAT helps to collapse the unix server industry but makes money on the margins of its demise (which was originally VA Linux's plan but RHAT had the better fortune initially, in no small part because of hiring and retaining key talent (which was originally the Cygnus plan).

In theory, that frees up a lot of capital to invest in real productivity. In practice, all that capital gets *exported* to markets that help drive down the price of labor, quality of working conditions, etc.

And, in theory, that's just a fair game collapse but in practice there are only a small number of winners -- so "market making" is concentrated in a few hands and private, fiat-based, de facto powers of taxation and regulation arise. Your right to buy and sell some product X, or your right to privacy in a transaction -- all that kind of stuff -- is increasingly decided in venues like cocktail parties in Aspen. Meanwhile, you can't find a job as a stockboy to save your life and there isn't the machine screw you need on any shelf in a radius of 80 miles.

Make more sense now?

-t

E-bay as a barometer of the economy.
Fri Aug 22 03:59:00 -0700 2008
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Makes sense, but it's absurd. Ebay has or is anyway near a monopoly on the retail sector? Fat chance. And without it your and Guy's arguments fall apart.

E-bay as a barometer of the economy.
Fri Aug 22 08:16:34 -0700 2008
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Just to tease apart some tangled confusion here:

Guy's crystal ball sees E-Bay et al. vertically integrating (e.g., buying a shipping company) and growing more, and taking over the world -- at least in this "skit" he's extrapolating that far.

My crystal ball is different and sees E-Bay, big box retail, other big Internet retail and all that.... sees that sector of the economy at brenschluss. I see the threat Guy is talking about but not much actual risk.

There *is* actual risk very close to what Guy is talking about in other ways. For example, Google's natural near-monopoly on search, the oligopoly of a few big email services... those kinds of privatization do grant private orgs (that happen to be huge) with quasi-governmental powers of surveillance, regulation, and transactional taxation. This *is* a big bug.

The corrective concept is "common carrier" and that concept could be applied as well to retail market makers. For example, E-Bay, regarded as a common carrier for retail transactions, could be forbidden by the FCC from trying to mandate the use of Paypal. Google, regarded as a common carrier for search could be forbidden from user tracking and required to wholesale access to their map-reduce page-cache "thing" to competitors.

I'm really not too keen on the alternative (that we are currently living in). The alternative (current reality) is that hubs like Google are basically big AI programs doing robotic planning in a centralized way (treating users as stochastically observable and controllable robots). I really don't like being part of some grad-school drop-out's AI experiment just because I happen to want to peek into the page cache and link indexes.

Still, I don't think they actually will quite take over all of retail. This is one of those cases where I think Guy has the right broad outline of where the capitalists tend to push things, but the wrong details over how the retail sector plays out.

-t